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MIND THE GAP: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
ACTIONS IN THE CASE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Abstract: We explore the effect of the interplay between a firm’s external and internal 
actions on market value in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, 
drawing from the neo-institutional theory, we distinguish between external and internal CSR 
actions and argue that they jointly contribute to the accumulation of intangible firm resources 
and are therefore associated with better market value. Importantly, though, we find that, on 
average, firms undertake more internal than external CSR actions, and we theorize that a 
wider gap between external and internal actions is negatively associated with market value. 
We confirm our hypotheses empirically, using the market-value equation and a sample 
comprising 1,492 firms in 33 countries from 2002 to 2008. Finally, we discuss implications 
for future research and practice. 
Key words: corporate social responsibility (CSR), sustainability, market value, legitimacy, 
external and internal actions, market-value equation 
Managerial Summary: Companies often accumulate intangible assets by taking internally 
and externally oriented CSR actions. Contrary to popular beliefs, the data shows that they 
undertake more internal than external ones: firms do more and communicate less. How does a 
potential gap (i.e., a misalignment) between internal and external CSR actions affect a firm’s 
market value? We find that although together (the sum of) internal and external actions are 
positively associated with market value, a wider gap has negative implications. In other 
words, firms do not realize the full benefits of their internal actions when such actions are not 
externally communicated to key stakeholders, and the investment community in particular. 
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This negative association with market value is particularly salient in CSR-intensive and the 
natural resources and extractives industries. 
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In recent years, firms have undertaken an increasing number of voluntary environmental, social, 
and corporate governance initiatives—often referred to collectively as “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) actions (Carroll, 1979; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 
2001)—in response to growing institutional pressures for responsible practices, community 
involvement, increased transparency, higher labor standards, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, 
and numerous other social and environmental causes (Campbell, 2007; Waddock, 2008). Firms 
respond to such pressures by taking actions aimed at audiences external to the organization (e.g., 
branding, disclosure, partnerships) as well as those that target internal audiences (e.g., training, 
forming board committees). These actions may be taken proactively to mitigate the risk of 
potential stakeholders’ backlash or retroactively to integrate stakeholders’ demands and 
expectations into the firm’s operations, structures, and processes (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Crilly, 
Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Neumann, Cennamo, Bettinazzi et al., 2013). Responding to stakeholder 
pressures through CSR is increasingly perceived as a key determinant of long-run firm 
prosperity (Clarkson, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014), and the 
overall relationship between CSR and firm performance has been found to be statistically 
significant and positive (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). However, the literature to date 
has not theoretically distinguished between different types of CSR actions that firms undertake; 
thus, the key issue of how the dynamic interplay between external and internal CSR actions may 
be associated with firm performance remains underexplored. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms undertake external and internal CSR actions in 
many different ways and to different extents. Unilever, for example, formalizes its internal 
CSR actions through its “Sustainable Living Plan” strategy while also undertaking several 
external actions to communicate to key stakeholders, and to capital market participants in 
particular, the objectives and outcomes of that strategy. Paul Polman himself, Unilever’s 
CEO, often explains that the main goal of this strategy is to double Unilever’s sales while 
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reducing its environmental impact. Through detailed reports and other disclosures, the firm 
explains why this goal makes business sense, sets out intermediate targets on its way to 
reaching the overall goal, and elaborates on how it plans to achieve them.
1
 In other words, by 
aligning internal and external actions, Unilever lays the foundation for internal transformation 
as well as external credibility. 
However, many firms that contribute positively to society and the environment 
through their daily operations, their products and services, and importantly, their internal 
CSR actions do not sufficiently and strategically complement and convey their contributions 
through external CSR actions. Triple Pundit, a leading global media resource on CSR issues, 
identifies the lack of external actions as the number one mistake firms make with respect to 
CSR.
2
 The resulting gap between their external and internal actions prevents the full value of 
their CSR engagement from being reflected in their market performance.  
On the other hand, some companies engage in external actions to a greater extent than 
internal. For example, in 2000 British Petroleum (BP) reportedly spent $7 million researching 
the new “Beyond Petroleum” Helios brand and $25 million on a campaign to support this 
brand change; it was a “triumph of style over substance,” as Greenpeace later concluded, 
because BP spent more on its logo that year than it did on renewable energy the previous year 
(Visser, 2011). BP undertook relatively more external actions than its set of internal actions 
could justify; as a result, it risked being identified as a “green-washing” company. 
Given this wide range of approaches to the mix of external and internal actions, an 
important question arises regarding the dynamic relationship between external and internal 
actions and, in particular, how it may be associated with market value. In this study, we 
explore this question in the CSR setting for three main reasons. First, the issue of alignment 
                                                 
1
 See Unilever’s “Sustainable Living Plan—A Progress Report” at: http://www.unilever.co.uk/Images/USLP-
Progress-Report-2012-FI_tcm28-352007.pdf (last accessed May 9, 2015). 
2
 For more information, please see http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/07/top-10-mistakes-cr-communications/ 
(last accessed May 9, 2015). 
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or misalignment is particularly salient in this context given that an increasing number of firms 
worldwide undertake CSR actions both inside and outside the organization (Weaver, Trevino, 
& Cochran, 1999b). Second, anecdotal evidence confirms that the degree to which internally 
and externally focused actions are aligned differs significantly across firms. For example, the 
Boston Consulting Group and the MIT Sloan Management Review trace differences between 
(a) companies whose actions match their stated beliefs and (b) companies whose beliefs and 
actions are out of sync. They find that only 40 percent of organizations report addressing 
sustainability issues, and that only 10 percent are fully tackling them.
3
 Third, a firm’s 
intangible resources are a key element for understanding the mechanisms through which CSR 
actions are associated with value creation. For example, Surroca, Tribó, and Waddock (2010) 
provide empirical evidence for the mediating effect of a firm’s intangible assets in the CSR-
value creation process. 
Our main theoretical focus therefore is on arguing for a salient distinction between 
external and internal actions and on understanding how the interplay between them is 
associated with firm performance. We argue for a joint effect of the dynamic accumulation of 
intangible firm resources via the undertaking of internal and external actions, and for an 
undermining effect of the misalignment between them. More specifically, our central 
theoretical arguments posit (a) a positive association between the sum of internal and external 
actions and a firm’s market value, and (b) a negative association between the gap between 
external and internal actions and market value. In the former case, we argue that prior internal 
actions in conjunction with current external actions generate organizational legitimacy 
through structural change and subsequent external endorsement by outside audiences, thus 
favorably affecting market value. In the latter case, we suggest that a wider gap between 
current external and prior internal actions represents an inferior alignment between efforts to 
                                                 
3
 For more information, please see: 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/sustainability_process_industries_sustainability_next_frontier
_walking_talk_issues_matter_most/ (last accessed May 9, 2015). 
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build internal resources and to seek external endorsements for them. Such a misalignment 
could be detrimental for market value: where external actions outweigh internal, the market is 
more likely to classify and penalize the firm as a “green-washing” one; where internal actions 
outweigh external, the market is more likely to fail to fully acknowledge and reflect the value 
of CSR due to the lack of transparency and credibility on the firm’s internal actions. 
To test our theory, we use an original dataset from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, which 
allows us to conduct a longitudinal analysis as well as a cross-country comparison. Our final 
sample includes 5,958 observations for 1,492 unique firms in 33 countries over 7 years 
(2002–2008). Methodologically, we introduce a novel empirical strategy from innovation 
economics—the market-value equation—that allows us to quantify the effect of the sum of 
and the gap between external and internal actions on a firm’s market value. To the extent 
possible, we address endogeneity problems by including firm fixed effects in all 
specifications, and we corroborate our main findings through auxiliary analysis that exploits 
industry-level variation in our sample. However, we are cautious about making causal claims, 
and we maintain that our work is a first step toward fully exploring the distinction between 
external and internal CSR actions, and the link between their dynamic interplay and 
performance; more work is needed in the future to verify and establish cause and effect. 
This article makes three key contributions. First, we integrate the literature on CSR 
with insights on organizational legitimacy from the neo-institutional theory by exploring CSR 
actions as the key unit of analysis and theoretically distinguishing between external and 
internal CSR actions. Second, we conceptualize and characterize a joint as well as an 
undermining dynamic interplay between external and internal actions, which constitute 
important determinants of a firm’s market value. Third, empirically, we introduce the market-
value approach from innovation economics into the study of the relationship between 
different types of CSR actions and firm performance, thus advancing the strategic CSR 
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literature. This approach helps resolve prior ambiguity about the mechanisms that link social 
and financial performance by estimating the impact of intangible assets created by the sum of 
and the gap between external and internal actions on market value. We are thus able to 
present a more nuanced empirical as well as theoretical understanding of the mechanisms 
through which two distinct types of CSR actions may be associated with value creation. 
 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CSR ACTIONS AND MARKET VALUE 
Previous studies argue that, over time, CSR actions may cumulatively generate valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable firm resources that in turn may become the foundation for a 
competitive advantage (e.g., Russo & Fouts, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001; Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown et al., 2001; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Choi & 
Wang, 2009). Prior literature also identifies several specific mechanisms through which CSR 
leads to superior performance: better employee engagement (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 
1994) and human resource capabilities (Brekke & Nyborg, 2004), premium prices or 
increased demand (Brown & Dacin, 1997), knowledge sharing with suppliers (Dyer & Singh, 
1998), favorable access to international markets (Hawn, 2013) and local infrastructure 
through local communities (Fombrun, 1996), better access to capital (Cheng, Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014) and ethical investors (Baron & Diermeier, 2007), and the preemption of 
regulatory intervention (Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000; Baron, 2001). Moreover, a stream 
of literature recognizes the importance of risk and how it affects the link between CSR and 
value creation: for example, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) show that improved 
environmental risk management is associated with a lower cost of capital, and Godfrey 
(2005) and Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) confirm that CSR may yield insurance-like 
protection for companies. Siegel and McWilliams (2011: 1491) further conceptualize CSR as 
a “co-specialized asset” that makes other assets more valuable than they would be otherwise. 
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In this sense, we can add CSR to the list of “invisible resources” invaluable to a firm’s 
competitive advantage (Itami & Roehl, 1987): “invisible” precisely because (1) CSR is 
unattainable with money alone; (2) it is time consuming to develop; (3) CSR resources are 
capable of multiple, simultaneous use; and (4) these resources yield multiple, simultaneous 
benefits. 
The existing work, however, does not theoretically distinguish between two principal 
components of the CSR resource accumulation process—the undertaking of internal and 
external actions. Instead, many studies either decompose CSR into environmental, social, and 
governance issues or typically adopt the classification schemes of the data providers; thus, 
categorization of CSR actions is predominantly ad hoc and atheoretical. According to the 
neo-institutional theory, to meet institutional pressures and gain legitimacy, firms 
strategically take two types of actions (e.g., King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005): internally 
focused actions, aimed at achieving structural change—for example, structural mimicry 
which constitutes the adoption of appropriate and accepted organizational structures and 
strategies (usually already implemented by large, established firms)—and externally focused 
actions, such as those aimed at gaining organizational endorsement by external constituents 
(e.g., Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007; McDonnell & King, 2013). The distinction between 
internal and external actions is conceptually adjacent to the distinction between internal and 
external audiences in the stakeholder theory (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison, Wicks 
et al., 2010): while the former set of stakeholders lie within the narrow boundaries of the firm 
(i.e., employees, managers, owners), the latter generally lie outside the organization (i.e., 
society, government, customers, suppliers, creditors, and shareholders). 
Yet, both internal and external actions may generate legitimacy: whereas internal 
actions signal conformity with legitimized structures (e.g., Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005; 
Sine et al., 2007) and thus help organizations gain legitimacy (e.g., Fligstein, 1985; Human & 
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Provan, 2000; Khaire, 2010), external actions target particular audiences that confer 
legitimacy upon the organization (e.g., through their public endorsement). In turn, legitimacy 
is critical for firm survival, predictability, growth, and profitability (e.g., Ruef & Scott, 1998; 
Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Corbett, Montes-Sancho, & Kirsch, 2005; King et al., 2005; 
Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between these two 
types of CSR actions to better understand how they may be associated with firm 
performance. 
Accumulation of CSR resources 
Internal actions typically reflect inward-looking practices that involve real actions to develop 
organizational capabilities and to meet the expectations of those social actors upon which the 
organization depends for critical resources; as a result, because of their structural nature, 
internal actions sometimes constrain internal flexibility (e.g., Kamens, 1977; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Fligstein, 1985). Furthermore, they often require significant changes in core 
practices, norms, structures, and routines or even long-term investments to adapt corporate 
policies and organizational culture (Eccles et al., 2014); thus, they also involve some risk 
(Berrone, Gelabert, & Fosfuri, 2009). In the context of CSR, the set of internal actions 
includes, for instance, the enactment of CSR-related change initiatives and corporate policies, 
such as adopting and implementing a policy to increase water and energy efficiency, or 
forming a board-level CSR committee. 
External actions, on the other hand, typically reflect public and highly visible 
initiatives and patterns of communication that involve the undertaking of ceremonies to gain 
legitimacy, primarily through the seeking of public endorsement of the organization and its 
practices by outside audiences. Media attention (Sine et al., 2007), organizational status 
(Podolny, 1993), inter-organizational networks (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), and 
legitimacy of external ties (Baum & Oliver, 1991) play a critical role in achieving legitimacy 
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through externally oriented actions. External actions, then, are best conceived of as 
organizational practices that are known tacitly and understood through communication by 
symbolic means (Yanow, 1996); as a result, they can lead to the accumulation of social 
capital (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). With regard to CSR, the set of external actions would 
include, for instance, public claims and reports that publicize certain actions the firm has 
taken, such as commitments to environmental targets, and the issuance of a sustainability 
report to communicate the firm’s environmental and social initiatives to external audiences. 
Certainly, firms take both types of actions concurrently, making internally focused 
structural change initiatives while externally seeking public endorsements by key social 
actors. Yet, it is the process of choice that leads to action: if a firm follows one particular 
course of action, it must forgo others (Simon, 1947). Therefore, the choices companies make 
could either increase the gap between or decrease the sum of their external and internal 
actions; however, we currently understand little about the implications of this choice for 
market performance. While rational organizations arguably make rational choices that 
maximize firm value, we still do not know how CSR resources accumulate from such choices 
in the first place. 
In light of the differences between internal and external actions, we argue that in a 
given period, the stock of intangible CSR resources is more likely to be the result of prior 
internal actions in combination with current external actions. To the extent that internal 
actions often dictate significant organizational changes, we suggest that the accrual of 
legitimacy through these actions may take relatively longer to materialize than the accrual of 
legitimacy via externally focused and predominantly ceremonial actions. This argument is 
consistent with Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1506), who suggest that “strategic asset stocks are 
accumulated by choosing appropriate time paths of flows over a period of time” but who also 
identify several factors (e.g., asset erosion, causal ambiguity) that may affect how different 
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actions influence the asset accumulation process.  
This distinction between prior internal and current external actions in the process of 
accumulating intangible resources is particularly salient in the CSR context. Consider, for 
example, the issuance of a sustainability report: in line with our definition, it is an external 
action the firm takes to convey information about internal actions taken in the prior year, 
provided that it takes at least a year for these actions to be implemented, legitimized, and 
actually produce results and/or have an impact (e.g., the adoption of an environmental or 
waste or water management system). In other words, we suggest that the CSR intangible 
resources accumulation process is by and large the result of the underlying differences in 
communication dynamics: while contemporaneous external actions may report the beginning 
of internal actions (i.e., some policy taking effect), external actions following a year of 
internal actions being implemented may in fact communicate progress or results that external 
audiences (and capital markets in particular) value more than simple announcements of (or 
intentions of future) CSR engagement. This combination of prior internal and current external 
actions then describes valuable CSR intangible resources. 
Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis posits a positive relationship between market value and CSR resources, 
as the sum of internal and external actions. Specifically, we suggest that external actions raise 
overall transparency and awareness about the firm, its products, structures, and practices, for 
a wide set of stakeholders, particularly for investors and public equity markets.
4
 This effect is 
likely to be stronger when it materializes jointly with already established firm processes, 
structures, and competencies that were generated through prior internal actions. Thus, we 
argue that prior internal and current external actions jointly are likely to positively affect 
market value for two main reasons: (a) each set of actions individually enhances firm 
                                                 
4
 We note that Servaes and Tamayo (2013) discuss a similar mechanism by arguing that product advertising in 
conjunction with CSR leads to value creation; however, they focus on a single stakeholder (i.e., consumers) and 
characterize a distinct underlying mechanism (i.e., generalized consumer awareness) from our study. 
Mind the Gap: External and Internal Actions 
13 
legitimacy, and (b) they credibly reduce information asymmetry between the firm and a 
critical stakeholder—namely the investor community and capital markets—regarding the 
firm’s CSR engagement. This latter reason is particularly important because firms with an 
enhanced CSR profile are more likely to be rewarded by investors and the capital markets 
(e.g., Cheng et al., 2014; Hawn, Chatterji, & Mitchell, 2014). Summarizing the above 
discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The more prior internal and current external actions that a firm 
undertakes (i.e., the greater their sum), the higher its market value. 
Next, we consider the area where the theoretical distinction between internal and 
external CSR actions is particularly important—understanding the implications of a 
misalignment between them. Even though both types of actions fall within the same overall 
organizational practice (i.e., CSR engagement), the extent to which a firm engages in one 
type of action may either exceed or fall behind the extent to which it engages in the other. 
Such a misalignment may occur for many reasons, but the gap this process generates may 
compel internal and external audiences, stakeholders, and especially the market to withdraw 
their support.  
On the one hand, if, on average, a firm engages in relatively more internal actions that 
are not adequately conveyed and communicated externally (i.e., not complemented by 
external actions), then its credibility is undermined because the capital markets, and its 
investors in particular, will be unable to fully recognize any value that may be created 
through CSR. In other words, due to this lack of alignment between internal and external 
actions, and a perceived lack of transparency and accountability with regard to CSR issues by 
the investor community, the firm’s valuations will likely suffer. On the other hand, if, on 
average, a firm engages in relatively more external actions to achieve public endorsements 
but has failed to make sufficient structural changes (i.e., internal actions), then it is more 
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likely to be identified as a “green-washing” firm and to suffer lower valuations due to the 
increased risk of being exposed, particularly in the medium and long run.   
This argument based on the distinction between prior and contemporaneous firm 
actions is broadly consistent with a stream of work that explores the reaction of a different set 
of stakeholders (i.e., customers) to a firm’s current CSR activities by taking into account the 
results of prior action (or inaction) by the firm in the form of reputation.
5
 For example, 
Schuler and Cording (2006) posit that if a firm’s current actions and past reputation are 
incongruent, then customers do not respond positively to CSR information. Also, Barnett 
(2007) argues that the response to CSR actions by customers will depend on their prior 
beliefs regarding the focal firm’s intentions and that therefore the same activity may generate 
different benefits for different firms. In the same spirit, Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen (2010) 
suggest that the positive effect of CSR communication may be amplified for firms having a 
good prior reputation. In fact, Servaes and Tamayo (2013) empirically confirm that 
advertising has a negative impact on the relationship between CSR and firm value if the 
firm’s CSR efforts are inconsistent with its overall reputation. 
We extend this line of theorizing by distinguishing between internal and external 
actions and exploring the implications for firm value through a different stakeholder and a 
distinct mechanism: the investor community and public equity markets. We predict that the 
gap between current external and prior internal actions will be negatively associated with a 
firm’s market value. When such a gap exists, unknowingly (when internal outweigh external 
actions) or knowingly (when external outweigh internal actions) for the firm, stakeholders 
can challenge the firm based on either the lack of transparency or the loss of credibility, 
where credibility describes firm attributes such as trustworthiness and believability in the 
eyes of other social actors (Brown, 2008; Neumann et al., 2013). MacLean and Behnam 
                                                 
5
 However, this stream of work does not distinguish between different types of actions; therefore, the 
comparison is essentially between prior and current actions of the same type. Instead, our argument extends this 
dynamic comparison across different types of CSR actions (i.e., external and internal actions). 
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(2010) analyze such a case in which external actions outweigh internal, creating the 
legitimacy façade by decoupling compliance from day-to-day operations and undermining 
firm credibility. Not only did the façade generate dissonant legitimacy perceptions with 
insiders, but it was also eventually detected by regulators and damaged the firm’s 
organizational legitimacy with external actors. 
Importantly, if internal CSR actions exceed external actions, social actors, and 
especially the capital markets, will be less likely to identify and reward their existence or to 
evaluate their effect, primarily because of information asymmetry: unless firms communicate 
and engage with stakeholders in a consistent (i.e., well-aligned) and credible manner, external 
audiences could well assume that the firm is not engaging in CSR.
6
 Thus, the lack of 
sufficient external actions will undermine internal ones in the sense that the firm will incur 
costs for which the full benefits will fail to materialize. Moreover, because internal actions 
are typically linked to structural shifts and change initiatives, they will likely be resisted by 
those internal stakeholders whose vested interests are hurt the most. In such a case, a lower 
level of external actions may imply insufficient leveraging of a firm’s external stakeholders 
and social capital, which constitute a plausible way through which the firm could remove 
such barriers to change and sources of resistance (Neumann et al., 2013).  
It follows, then, that firms that align external and internal actions more closely are 
able not only to build greater legitimacy (Berrone et al., 2009) but also to achieve greater 
market value, whereas firms having a wider gap between external and internal actions in 
either direction will be associated with lower market value. We summarize the above 
discussion through the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, multiple articles in the popular press suggest that a lot of firms undertake numerous internal CSR 
actions but then fail to fully convey this information, or, more broadly, they do not to match their internal 
actions with external actions. See for example: http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/516-5-tips-for-marketing-
csr-in-the-context-of-our-new-reality (last accessed May 9, 2015). 
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Hypothesis 2: The wider the gap between a firm’s current external and prior internal 
actions, the lower its market value. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Econometric specification 
We propose that because of their intangible nature, CSR resources are conceptually 
analogous to technological knowledge; therefore, to test our hypotheses we introduce a 
specification from the R&D literature. In particular, we use the market-value equation, which 
was initially proposed by Griliches (1981) and later developed in subsequent work (e.g., 
Griliches, 1984; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Belenzon, 2012). In this equation, the market value of a 
firm i at time t (Vit) is modeled as the sum of the value of common stock, preferred stock, and 
total debt net of current assets. Equivalently, market value is a function of the firm’s tangible 
and intangible assets that jointly constitute the firm’s total stock of resources: 
 Vit = qt (Ait + γ Iit)
σ 
(1) 
where Vit denotes the market value of firm i at time t, Ait denotes ordinary physical assets, and 
Iit denotes intangible resources. Following prior work on intangibles in the market-value 
equation (Lenox, Rockart, & Lewin, 2010), we use R&D (RD) and advertising (ADV) 
expenditures as proxies for intangible assets (Iit) in addition to CSR resources (CSR): 
                                               Iit= βRDRDit + βADVADVit + βCSRCSRit .                                                      (2) 
The parameter σ in (1) allows for non-constant scale effects in the market-value function. All 
variables are in nominal terms. Taking logarithms, we obtain 
 log Vit = log qt + σ log Ait + σ log (1 + γ (Iit/Ait)). (3) 
The last term is typically approximated to γ (Iit/Ait). We checked that this approximation is 
accurate: our ratios do not exceed 15 percent in magnitude (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). 
In this specification, γ measures the shadow value of intangible resources relative to the 
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tangible assets of the firm, and σγ measures their absolute value. If the value function exhibits 
constant returns to scale (as it approximately does in the cross-section), then σ = 1, log A can 
be moved to the left side of the equation, and the model can be estimated with the 
conventional Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. Consequently, the equation that we 
estimate becomes 
 log Qit = log Vit/Ait = log qt + log (1 + γ (Iit/Ait)) + εit, (4) 
where Qit denotes Tobin’s q; the intercept of the model can be interpreted as an estimate of 
the logarithmic average of Tobin’s q for each year. Dividing each intangible asset by the 
tangible assets, we create R&D and Advertising Intensity. Based on our theory, CSR 
resources can be accumulated as a result of previous internal actions (It−1) and current 
external actions (Et). Therefore, to test Hypothesis 1, we operationalize the joint effect of 
internal and external actions as the sum CSRit = Eit + Iit−1, and to test Hypothesis 2, we 
operationalize the undermining effect (i.e., the gap between external and internal actions) as 
the absolute value of the difference CSRit = Eit − Iit−1, capturing the relationship between 
internal and external actions more directly. We take the absolute value of the gap to capture 
the misalignment in both directions.
7
 Hence, our final estimating equations become 
 log Qit = log qt + log (1 + θ1(Eit + Iit−1)/Ait) + θ2RD  Intensityit + θ3ADV Intensityit + εit, (5) 
log Qit = log qt + log (1 + θ1abs(Eit − Iit−1)/Ait) + θ2RD  Intensityit + θ3ADV Intensityit + εit. (6) 
For all specifications, we run panel regressions with both firm and year fixed effects 
to mitigate, to the extent possible, potential endogeneity issues. To corroborate our main 
findings and provide further evidence on the theoretical mechanisms at work, we also 
conduct two auxiliary analyses in industries where CSR issues are expected to be more 
salient. Next, we describe our data and discuss our key variables. 
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that this is the most appropriate way to operationalize the gap 
construct. 
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Sample and data collection 
We construct our sample using information from a number of databases. We obtain CSR data 
from Thomson Reuters (ASSET4);
8
 this relatively new dataset has already been validated in 
prior CSR literature (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014). ASSET4 
specializes in providing objective, relevant, auditable, and systematic CSR information and 
investment analysis tools to professional investors
9
 who build their portfolios by integrating 
CSR (non-financial) data into their traditional investment analysis. At ASSET4, trained 
research analysts collect about 900 evaluation points per firm, based on primary data that are 
objective and publicly available.
10
 Typical sources of information include stock exchange 
filings, financial and non-financial (sustainability) annual reports, non-governmental 
organizations’ websites, and a plethora of news sources.  
After gathering the raw CSR data, the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 analysts transform 
it into consistent units to enable quantitative analysis. Following this transformation, 
ASSET4 provides a z-score that essentially benchmarks the performance of the focal firm 
against the performance of the rest of the firms in the dataset. For instance, we note that (a) 
for environmental factors the data would typically include information on energy used, water 
recycled, CO2 emissions, waste recycled, and spills and pollution controversies; (b) for social 
factors the data would typically include employee turnover, injury rate, training hours, 
women employees, donations, and health and safety controversies; and (c) for corporate 
governance, a typical set of indicators would include executive compensation, board 
experience, board diversity, anti-takeover devices, and compensation controversies.  
In addition, we collect stock market data from DataStream, analyst coverage data 
                                                 
8
 ASSET4 was a privately held firm with two institutional investors: Goldman Sachs and Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch. It was acquired by Thomson Reuters in 2009. 
9
 An estimated €2.5 trillion is invested under management using the ASSET4 data. 
10
 Analysts are only allowed to contact investor relations’ offices of firms to learn the location of public data. 
Not all of the 900 evaluation points are relevant and/or applicable for all companies; therefore, for each 
individual company fewer evaluation points are typically available. 
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from I/B/E/S, and accounting data from WorldScope. Our final sample, after taking into 
account the 1-year lag in one of our key independent variables (internal CSR actions), 
includes 5,958 observations for 1,492 unique firms during the period 2002–2008 across 33 
countries. Although a significant portion of firms in the sample originate in the U.S., U.K., 
and Japan, many come from Continental Europe, Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Dependent variable 
As discussed in the econometric specification, our dependent variable, measuring the firm’s 
market value according to the market-value equation, is Log (Tobin’s q). We calculate 
Tobin’s q as the ratio of the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus the book 
value of shareholders’ equity over total assets11 for the focal firm in each year in our sample. 
Independent variables 
We independently classified 120
12
 Thomson Reuters (ASSET4) data points made available to 
us through DataStream into two categories: internal and external actions. Specifically, first, 
we extensively discussed the definitions provided in the literature regarding internal and 
external actions and arrived at a working decision rule that we implemented to distinguish 
between internal and external actions. In particular, we agreed to classify as external those 
actions that appeared to be more externally oriented in terms of disclosure (e.g., reporting) 
and claims, and to classify as internal those actions that were more internally oriented in 
terms of policies. After we established this working decision rule, we independently 
classified the data points as external and internal.  
                                                 
11
 This is essentially equivalent to the sum of market capitalization and total liabilities divided by total assets 
given that in Datastream the book value of shareholders’ equity (code WC03995) is calculated as total assets 
(DWTA) minus total liabilities (WC03351).  
12
 These 120 data points (out of a possible max of 900 per company) were not specifically chosen by the authors 
but rather were available through DataStream in 2012. They are part of what Thomson Reuters (ASSET4) calls 
the “Strategic Framework” and are arguably representative of the totality of evaluation points available. 
Specifically, the company notes that this enhanced framework consisting of a subset of the 900 data points is 
based on extensive analysis of all the data points, looking at customer usage stats, data availability, and their 
own in-house research. This framework, according to the company, best aligns to sustainability reporting trends 
and global reporting guidelines, offering a stronger focus on objective and comparable quantitative and process-
driven data since none of these data points changed over time. For more information, the interested reader may 
follow: http://extranet.datastream.com/data/ASSET4%20ESG/Index.htm  (last accessed September 17, 2014). 
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Therefore, the internal actions category includes corporate policy questions as well as 
several quantitative indicators of CSR implementation, and the external actions category 
includes claims that firms make and disclosures they issue. Such claims and disclosures 
capture a firm’s communication patterns and are most likely intended to influence external 
stakeholders to generate public endorsements. Thus, the definitions applied to operationalize 
these constructs are consistent with prior literature in that corporate policies may result in the 
loss of internal flexibility (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and therefore reflect internal actions, 
whereas claims and disclosures include a critical aspect of communication (Yanow, 1996) 
and ceremonial conformity, and therefore constitute external actions. 
The inter-coder reliability was 89 percent. In cases of disagreement, we discussed 
further and, if necessary, contacted Thomson Reuters directly for additional clarification. To 
err on the conservative side with our classification scheme, we dropped all remaining 
questionable items. Unfortunately, half of all items had to be subsequently dropped because 
of majority missing data; of the remaining items, we initially coded 26 as external and 25 as 
internal actions. We then ran Cronbach’s alpha test to check whether the items measure the 
same underlying construct, and, because of negative coefficients on some of them, we 
dropped two items in the first test and two more in the second. The appendix lists the final 
composition of both indices. Cronbach’s alphas of 0.75 for the internal actions index (with 
inter-item covariance of 0.06) and 0.74 for the external one (with inter-item covariance of 
0.09) suggest very good internal consistency and reliability of the measures (George & 
Mallery, 2003). 
We acknowledge that, not surprisingly, the correlation between the two constructs 
within the same year is very high (0.74; it drops to 0.54 when we use lagged internal actions 
and weigh by assets as specified in the market-value equation), but we note that this is mainly 
because (a) we use secondary data, and (b) firms engage in both types of actions in trying to 
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fulfill their responsibility and credibly signal to various stakeholders that they have done so. 
Conceptually, however, they represent two distinct types of firm actions that we tease out in 
the analysis. In fact, the correlation is still below the typical threshold of 0.8, while the 
variables do pass the multicollinearity test (using the “collin” command in Stata). The 
variance inflation factor value is 2.24, much lower than the typical cut-off value of 10 and 
even the most conservative cut-off of 2.5.
13
 Most importantly, we use their sum and 
(absolute) difference in our specifications; thus the correlation issue is much less likely to 
affect our estimates in any systematic way. 
To further confirm the validity of our method for classifying internal and external 
actions, we tried a coding scheme based on the common and widely used subcategories of 
CSR (i.e., using the three pillars of environmental, social, and corporate governance factors 
and their sub-pillars from ASSET4): none of the resulting indices generated alphas greater 
than 0.7. This suggests that using such a rather atheoretical categorization of CSR actions 
results in the aggregation of random items that do not actually generate informative or 
credible measures. In contrast, our coding rule for producing indices of internal and external 
actions is relatively more robust and valid for measuring the underlying theoretical concepts. 
Finally, we normalize the constructed indices of internal and external actions on a 0-to-1 
scale to directly compare the association of their sum and gap with market value.  
We use internal and external actions to proxy for capital stocks of (intangible) CSR 
resources following prior literature that uses R&D and advertising expenditures as proxies for 
capital stocks because they tend to be stable over time (Helfat, 1994). We validate the 
stability of our measures of internal and external actions graphically (see Figure 1) and in a 
regression analysis (available upon request). In particular, using current-year measures of 
internal and external actions, as well as R&D expenditures as our dependent variables, we run 
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 The condition number (12.7) was also below the cut-off point of 15 
(http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf).  
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AR(1) and AR(2) models, and then add firm and year fixed effects. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that across all of these specifications, the stability of our measures of 
internal and external actions is equivalent to the stability of the R&D expenditures (i.e., the 
coefficients on the first and second lag are positive, highly significant, and of comparable 
magnitude), thus increasing confidence in their ability to proxy for capital stocks of CSR 
resources.
14
  
*******Insert Figure 1 about here******* 
After calculating the sum of and the absolute and real values of the difference 
between current external and prior internal actions, and dividing both by total (logged) 
assets
15
 (following the derivation of the market-value equation), we use Sum/Assets, Abs. 
Value (Gap/Assets), and Gap/Assets as our main independent variables in the empirical 
models. 
Control variables 
In addition to firm and year fixed effects
16
 capturing time-invariant firm attributes that could 
drive a firm’s market value, our main specifications include a number of control variables to 
capture the effect of time-varying and country-level factors. First, to control for other 
intangibles that may affect the market value as well as the CSP–CFP link (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2000),
 
we include R&D Intensity and SG&A Intensity as discussed above.
17
 Second, to 
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 In unreported results (available on request) we also followed Helfat (1994) and constructed 1-year, 2-year, 3-
year, 4-year, and 5-year lags for our measures of internal and external actions, as well as R&D expenditures. We 
then pairwise-correlated them with current internal, external, and R&D expenditures. All the correlations were 
statistically significant. The correlations for R&D expenditures were consistently above 0.90, whereas for 
internal and external actions, the correlations with the 1-year and 2-year lags were above 0.80. For 3-year lags 
and beyond, the correlations decrease but remain above 0.60. 
15
 We note that in addition to following the derivation of the market value equation, we divide the measures of 
internal and external actions by assets because we suggest that the more of these CSR actions a company is 
undertaking per unit size, the greater its underlying stock of intangible resources is. 
16
 Following the recommendation of an anonymous reviewer, we also run specifications that include a linear 
time trend and obtained virtually identical results. 
17
 Advertising data are notoriously difficult to come by and are scarce for the sample in this study. Thus, we 
cannot control for advertising intensity across all firms and years but instead add a control for Selling, General 
and Administrative (SG&A) Intensity; a variable that includes advertising in addition to other expenses. In 
unreported results, we also tried including an Advertising Intensity control variable for firms that did have data 
on advertising expenses: the results stayed virtually unchanged, even though we only had data for less than 10% 
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control for institutional country-level factors that may affect how the market values CSR 
resources, we include SRI Index, an indicator of the existence (or lack thereof) of a socially 
responsible stock market index in the focal country. Third, Analyst Coverage, measured as 
the number of analysts that cover a focal firm in each year, is a well-established measure 
from the accounting and finance literatures that controls for firm visibility (Pollock & Gulati, 
2007). Fourth, the logarithm of the number of four-digit SIC codes in which a firm operates 
each year controls for the degree of Diversification (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). 
Furthermore, following prior literature based on the market-value econometric specification 
(Belenzon, 2012), we include a measure of annual logged sales, Sales, and of annual sales 
growth, Sales Growth. Finally, Industry Concentration, measured as the logged sum of 
squared ratios of firm sales over total industry sales in each year, controls for industry-level 
changes in competitive dynamics. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in our 
econometric specifications. While average Sales are $148.5 mn, average Sales Growth stands 
at 13.68 percent, suggesting that firms in our sample enjoy significant growth opportunities. 
The average Tobin’s q is 2 with a standard deviation of 1.32 (the mean of its log is 0.55). The 
average Analyst Coverage is 14 per firm, indicating that the sample firms are relatively large 
and broadly visible in the public domain. None of the reported correlations appear to raise 
any concerns for the subsequent analysis. Moreover, the sum variable is positively correlated 
with Tobin’s q and the gap variable is negatively correlated with Tobin’s q, consistent with 
our theoretical predictions. Importantly, we note that, on average, and for the majority of our 
observations, the gap variable is negative, suggesting that firms undertake more internal than 
                                                                                                                                                        
of our sample. We coded observations with missing data as zero, but including a dummy for such cases did not 
affect our results. We did so because advertising expenses are reported separately only when they are considered 
material and therefore we interpret non-disclosure as lack of materiality. 
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external CSR actions. In our regression analysis we further explore this issue by 
distinguishing between cases of a positive and a negative gap. 
*******Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here******* 
Table 2 presents the main regression results of estimating the market-value equation, 
with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Model 1 represents a basic model with 
controls only: on average, higher-visibility firms (i.e., companies with greater analyst 
coverage and sales growth) appear to have greater market value, and firms with greater 
overall sales see lower market value (consistent with Belenzon, 2012). Models 2 and 3 
estimate the effect of lagged internal and current external actions separately, showing that 
external actions by themselves have a significant positive effect on market value. Model 4 
includes them together: the effect of external actions persists.  
Model 5 estimates equation (5) by introducing the sum of lagged internal and current 
external actions weighted by assets (as derived through the market-value equation): as 
predicted, the coefficient is positive and significant (β = 0.115, p < 0.01), providing support 
for H1. Model 6 estimates equation (6) by adding the weighted (absolute value) gap between 
current external and lagged internal actions; as predicted, the sign on the coefficient is 
negative and significant (β = −1.151, p < 0.01), suggesting that the wider the gap between a 
firm’s external and internal actions, the lower the firm’s market value. This result provides 
support for H2. Finally, we include a fully specified Model 7 that includes both the sum and 
the gap variables: the results stay virtually unchanged, except for the coefficient on the sum, 
which increases in magnitude.
18
  
Given that on average, our gap variable is negative, we also include estimations of the 
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 One potential concern with the results shown in Table 2 is that the significance of the coefficient on external 
actions may be driving our findings. To address this issue, in unreported tabulations (available on request) we 
replicate all the specifications of Table 2 by using current internal rather than lagged internal actions. While the 
coefficient on external actions remains equally significant, none of the coefficients on the independent variables 
of interest (i.e., gap, absolute gap, and interaction term with negative gap indicator variable) obtain significance. 
This suggests that external actions are not likely to drive the results. 
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market-value equation with the real value of the gap: in Model 8, by itself, it is positive and 
significant, and stays virtually unchanged in Model 9 that adds the sum. We also split our 
sample by the sign on the gap: Model 10 presents the results for the few observations with a 
positive gap (i.e., current external actions are higher than prior internal actions), and Model 
11, for the negative gap. These results overall suggest that the more external actions the firm 
undertakes than internal, the higher its market value. However, we are very cautious in 
interpreting results from Model 10 given that we only have 178 observations for a model with 
124 firms (i.e., fixed effects) involved and that drops an additional year dummy compared 
with the rest of the models due to insufficient data. Whenever internal actions outweigh 
external (Model 11), market value is negatively affected.
19
 
To further understand this asymmetric effect of the gap, we also calculate its 
economic significance from Model 8, keeping all controls at their mean value and comparing 
the effect of the increase/decrease in the real value of the gap with the average Tobin’s q 
from the descriptive statistics. When the gap takes its mean value, Tobin’s q is 22.5 percent 
higher than the average (2.45 vs. 2). An increase in the gap by one standard deviation is 
associated with a Tobin’s q that is 28.5 percent higher than the average (2.57 vs. 2). On the 
other hand, a decrease in the gap by one standard deviation is associated with a Tobin’s q 15 
percent higher than the average (2.3 vs. 2); by two standard deviations, it is 9.5 percent 
higher; by three, it is 3 percent higher. The breaking point happens when we decrease the gap 
by four standard deviations: Tobin’s q is 3 percent lower than the average (1.94 vs. 2); by 
five, it is 8 percent lower (1.84 vs. 2). At the minimum value of the gap (when internal 
actions completely outweigh external ones), Tobin’s q is 26.5 percent lower than the average 
(1.47 vs. 2). In other words, on average, it appears that a better balance between the two types 
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 In unreported results, rather than splitting the sample, we create an indicator variable for observations with a 
negative gap and interact it with the absolute value of the gap: the coefficient on the sum remains positive and 
significant, the interaction term obtains a negative and significant coefficient, and the coefficient on the baseline 
absolute gap does not obtain significance. 
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of actions and, in fact, engaging a bit more in external than in internal actions is more 
positively associated with market value, and that a true disconnect between internal and 
external actions (taking place after deducting four standard deviations and beyond from the 
gap) is negatively associated with market value (see Figure 2).  
*******Insert Figure 2 about here******* 
We note that we compare the estimated economic effects to the average value of 
Tobin’s q from the descriptive statistics (i.e., y-axis of Figure 2), ensuring that both the value 
of the gap and that of Tobin’s q lie within the range of our data. If we were to also add or 
deduct one standard deviation of Tobin’s q from the sample distribution, as we 
increase/decrease the value of the gap, then doing so would significantly diminish the size of 
our effects. In addition, we note that we also keep all other variables at their mean value as 
the size of the gap increases/decreases. 
Auxiliary analyses 
To corroborate our main findings and to test more directly for the theoretical mechanisms at 
work (i.e., markets punishing firms for a wider gap), we undertook two more empirical tests. 
First, given that the natural resources and extractive industries are heavily scrutinized (not 
only by markets but also by regulators and the general public), we construct an indicator 
variable, Natural Res. & Extractives, for firms in industries such as water, forestry, coal, 
aluminum, gold mining, integrated oil and gas, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, platinum 
and precious metals, farming and fishing. If the mechanisms we argue for are valid, then we 
expect that for firms in these industries, the gap will be more strongly associated with market 
value (i.e., we expect CSR issues to be more material for firms in natural resources and 
extractive industries) compared with other industries. We interact the indicator variable with 
our gap measure, and we also split the sample by observations that belong to these industries 
or not (i.e., the rest). Table 3 shows the results, supporting our hypothesis that the gap is 
Mind the Gap: External and Internal Actions 
27 
particularly costly in these industries (Models 12 and 13). In fact, the split-sample analysis 
shows that in the rest of the industries, the coefficient on the gap is not significant, even 
though it remains directionally consistent (Model 14).  
Second, we undertook an equivalent analysis for CSR-intensive industries, finding 
similar results. In particular, we created an indicator variable for CSR-intensive industries by 
first constructing a firm-level measure of CSR, as the sum of the environmental, social, and 
governance indices in the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database, then calculating the industry-
level average CSR score, and coding a focal industry as being CSR-intensive whenever its 
mean CSR is higher than the median CSR score (of the means) across industries.
20
 Table 4 
presents the results of this analysis. Model 15 presents the results of a pooled analysis where 
we find a negative and highly significant effect on the interaction term between the absolute 
gap and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for CSR-intensive industries. Models 16 
and 17 present a split-sample analysis confirming a negative and highly significant effect on 
the absolute gap for firms in CSR-intensive industries and a directionally consistent but 
insignificant coefficient for the rest of the industries. 
*******Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here******* 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To gain a more nuanced understanding of how CSR could be associated with firm value, it is 
critical to investigate the variety of strategic responses that firms adopt, rather than treat CSR 
as a monolithic construct. However, many prior studies that focus on the link between CSR 
and performance do not theoretically distinguish between different types of CSR actions. 
Instead, they often use a composite CSR score as the dependent or independent variable of 
interest, consisting of various screens or categories typically created by the data provider 
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 The indicator for CSR-intensive industries is correlated with the Natural Res. & Extractives dummy at only 
5.6 percent. 
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rather than categories that are theoretically grounded. We suggest that this limitation may 
lead to unreliable findings or even spurious relationships (Margolis et al., 2007). In an 
attempt to advance the literature in this important respect, we draw from and extend the neo-
institutional as well as the CSR literatures, arguing for a theoretical distinction between 
external and internal actions and theorizing about how their dynamic interplay may be 
associated with performance. We thus integrate across these two literatures by adopting the 
CSR actions as our level of analysis and by investigating how important they jointly are for 
market value. Importantly, our key contribution is to shed light on the relationship between a 
gap across internal and external actions and market value. 
To be more specific, the main theoretical implication of our study relates to the long-
standing debate on the relationship between CSR and financial performance. Prior research 
has demonstrated a positive and statistically significant link (Margolis et al., 2007; Eccles et 
al., 2014); however, the mechanisms through which the link materializes have not yet been 
adequately understood. In this paper we find that internal and external CSR actions jointly 
have a significant positive association with market value. However, when we separate these 
actions and evaluate the role of the gap between them, we find that the wider the gap—in 
particular, the more internal actions a firm undertakes than external—the more the firm is 
penalized in terms of market value. This is a key finding that may partially explain why 
several prior studies find inconsistent results on the relationship between CSR and 
performance. 
We suggest that the two hypotheses we develop represent a double edge of CSR: 
while firms that engage in both types of actions to a greater extent are associated with better 
performance, a wider gap between external and internal actions poses a significant risk for a 
firm’s market value. Interestingly, and consistent with some popular beliefs, we find in our 
sample that the gap between external and internal actions is, on average, due to insufficient 
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external actions (i.e., prior internal actions outweigh current external ones). In fact, there are 
only a few observations where the gap is positive, i.e. due to predominant external actions 
over internal ones, which is consistent with some views in the field of CSR 
communications.
21
 We speculate that for some companies, this might be part of an overall 
policy of secrecy (e.g., Apple). For others, it might be that they do not reveal their actions 
because (a) they think more experimentation is needed until they “get it right” (e.g., until they 
understand the materiality of the issues), (b) they might not want to attract additional 
stakeholder pressure or targeting by social movements or activist investors, and (c) they 
might be more risk-averse in terms of how investment analysts (or other rating agencies) may 
perceive such actions. What is important is that the greatest gap between internal and external 
actions (i.e., at the minimum value of the gap) is associated with a market value 26.5 percent 
lower than the average (40% lower than the market value at the mean value of the gap). On 
the other hand, when the gap is equal to zero, the market value is 36.5 percent higher than the 
average (11% higher than the market value at the mean value of the gap), and in very few 
cases when external actions outweigh internal ones (i.e., gap value at 0.02 or plus three 
standard deviations above the mean), the market value is 45 percent higher than the average 
(18% higher than the market value at the mean value of the gap).  
These estimated economic effects demonstrate significant differences in the 
relationship with market value: while a small disconnect between the two types of actions (in 
both directions) may, on average, have a positive effect on market value, a significant 
disconnect between them (i.e., when the firm engages in much more internal actions that are 
not followed up by external ones) appears to be the most disadvantageous scenario for the 
firm. This is consistent with our core theoretical argument that a lack of alignment between 
internal and external actions is likely to be perceived as lack of transparency and 
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 See for example, http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/07/top-10-mistakes-cr-communications/ or 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/beyond_corporate_social_responsibility_integrated_external_engag
ement or http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/516-5-tips-for-marketing-csr-in-the-context-of-our-new-reality  
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accountability toward the investor community, and, therefore, the firm’s valuations are likely 
to suffer. In other words, unless firms communicate and engage with stakeholders in a 
consistent (i.e., well-aligned) and credible manner, external audiences could well assume that 
the firm is not sufficiently engaging in CSR. Therefore, our findings suggest that firms may 
generate and capture highest market returns when they not only substantively change their 
processes and procedures to integrate CSR but also communicate effectively the changes they 
undertake to key capital market participants. Hence, our approach helps integrate prior work 
on structural change and the seeking of external endorsements as strategic firm responses, 
which is a key step toward arriving at a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms of 
potential value creation in the context of CSR. An interesting next step for future work would 
be to develop a process understanding of how specific internal and external CSR actions 
evolve and combine over time, as part of a firm’s process of strategic asset accumulation, to 
potentially build and sustain a competitive advantage.  
Within the strategic CSR literature, we contribute to the stream of work that 
conceptualizes CSR as a resource, by exploring the link between the accumulation of 
strategic firm resources and the building and sustaining of a competitive advantage (e.g., 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Although scholars have already identified 
CSR as a potential strategic resource on which a competitive advantage may be built (e.g., 
Russo & Fouts, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Ruf et al., 2001; 
Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Choi & Wang, 2009), the process of accumulating an intangible 
CSR resource remains less understood. Our work relates to the theory developed by Maurer, 
Bansal, and Crossan (2011), who introduce a culturally informed RBV that explains how 
cultural elements in the firm’s institutional context (specifically, social values that guide 
perception of benefits) may create or destroy economic value. We suggest that moving this 
broader research agenda forward requires explicitly considering the diversity of actions 
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across firms in general and in conjunction with a firm’s institutional context as well as 
distinguishing between and exploring how internal and external CSR actions may interact 
differentially with the institutional context, and its embedded social values, to affect 
economic value creation.  
In addition to the strategic CSR domain, we contribute to the neo-institutional 
literature by analyzing decoupling between internal and external actions in the CSR context 
(e.g., MacLean & Behnam, 2010; Weaver et al., 1999b). In so doing we expand our currently 
limited view of the effect of decoupling on firm value (Westphal & Zajac, 1998), which 
mainly examines the determinants of decoupling, its varying degrees (Westphal & Zajac, 
2001; Westphal & Graebner, 2010), and how it results in legitimacy even though 
organizational actions can be illegitimate (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Here, we suggest that the 
evaluation by external audiences, and especially markets, of the gap between external and 
internal actions—particularly when firms do more internal than external actions—may be a 
key mechanism linking these actions to performance. Moreover, such an evaluation may have 
a differential impact across industries: in our auxiliary analyses, we show that the effect only 
persists in CSR-intensive and in natural resources and extractive industries. 
Limitations and future research 
There are certain limitations in our study that we hope will provide opportunities for future 
research. First, even though our dataset is relatively comprehensive within the CSR context, it 
imposes certain limitations on our operationalization of key concepts due to its secondary 
nature: follow-up studies could measure internal and external actions more directly within 
CSR or in other relevant contexts. Second, while this paper establishes solid correlational 
relationships between internal and external actions and market value, we acknowledge the 
potential endogeneity issues inherent in evaluating the impact of the sum of (or the gap 
between) internal and external actions on firm value. We are thus cautious about making any 
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causal claims. Indeed, as the editors of the Strategic Management Journal recently argued, 
“Studies also need not necessarily seek to establish causality. Presenting facts and asking 
questions about possible explanations of these facts serves an important purpose. Studies that 
raise questions about a phenomenon can be as valuable as studies that seek to provide 
answers” (Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat et al., 2014: 950). Relatedly, we note that the causality 
issue has been central in the strategic CSR literature to date and that more recent studies, 
using different empirical methodologies or alternative shocks, address the endogeneity of the 
combined CSR effect on firm performance more directly (e.g., Flammer, 2013; Eccles et al., 
2014; Hawn et al., 2014). 
Third, given that we find that, on average, firms in our sample intriguingly “walk” 
more than they “talk”, with reference to the title of this paper, we infer that in the context of 
CSR, companies should be mindful of this gap. Future research could delve further into this 
intriguing area using alternative empirical tools and complementary theoretical lenses. For 
example, future studies could seek to understand how persistent this effect is in a more 
dynamic context, when internal actions become more salient, when monitoring and 
verification costs diminish (e.g., emergence of social media and auditing standards for 
sustainability disclosures), and when external constituents start demanding that internal 
actions be followed by external ones, or vice versa. Future work could also match a specific 
internal action to its external twin (or vice versa) and conduct a dynamic analysis at the dyad 
level, differentiating between the effects of such dual actions on performance or other 
outcomes. Supposedly the (exogenous) shock from some (internal or external) action-related 
event may help in disentangling their distinct effects. This could be done within much shorter 
periods than in our study: for example, days or months in financial event studies 
(unfortunately, our study is limited by the annual nature of our data).  
Finally, future studies can build upon our research and findings here, and focus on 
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other responses to institutional pressures, potentially in different empirical settings. Symbolic 
and substantive actions is one fruitful avenue for further study, as demonstrated by, for 
instance, corporate ethics programs (Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999a) and ethics codes 
(Stevens, Steensma, Harrison et al., 2005); self-disciplining or self-regulation tools, such as 
international certifiable management standards and industry- or government-led voluntary 
programs (King & Lenox, 2000; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Short 
& Toffel, 2010); and shareholder proposal activism (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007). 
Which particular actions have a larger impact than others is also open to further investigation. 
Our research also has implications for practice: given increasingly high institutional 
pressures on firms to become more environmentally, socially, and ethically responsible, 
managers around the world must make trade-offs when allocating scarce resources to CSR 
and other business activities. We argue that by engaging in CSR, a firm may accumulate 
“invisible resources” (Itami & Roehl, 1987), and we show that undertaking both internal and 
external CSR actions helps firms attain higher market value, and that a narrow gap between 
them is even better. Of course, we analyze the effect on market value only, whereas managers 
may rely on other indicators of performance to make their decisions, so our findings should 
be interpreted with caution. 
To conclude, our research has implications for both strategy scholars and executives: 
by distinguishing between internal and external actions and shedding light on the association 
with market value, we generate a better understanding of the drivers of performance 
heterogeneity across firms in the CSR context. By examining the role that internal and 
external actions play in the CSR resource accumulation process, we also contribute to the 
RBV theory and the strategic CSR literature. Methodologically, we repurpose the market-
value equation, advancing the empirical literature on CSR, while creating fruitful 
opportunities for future research. 
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Figure 1. Internal, External actions, Et-It gap and Et-It-1 gap over time. 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic significance of results for the gap, calculated using real values of 
the gap from Model 8 (Table 2) keeping all other variables at their mean. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 5,958) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Tobin’s q 1                         
2. Internalt /Assets 0.22 1 
           3. Externalt /Assets 0.01 0.54 1
          4. Sum/Assets 0.11 0.78 0.90 1
         5. Gap/Assets −0.16 −0.09 0.70 0.32 1
        6. R&D Intensity 0.24 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.00 1
       7. SG&A Intensity 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.16 −0.12 0.34 1
      8. Diversification −0.14 −0.06 0.08 0.02 0.13 −0.10 −0.15 1
     9. Industry Concentrn 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.09 1
    10. Sales −0.20 −0.24 0.21 0.01 0.44 −0.02 −0.46 0.27 −0.10 1
   11. Sales Growth 0.17 −0.08 −0.11 −0.12 −0.04 −0.01 −0.04 −0.03 0.02 −0.08 1
  12. Analyst Coverage 0.13 0.01 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.14 −0.02 0.08 0.21 −0.06 1
 13. SRI Index 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.22 −0.08 −0.30 0.01 −0.06 0.06 1
Mean 2.00 0.06 0.02 0.07 −0.04 2.49 0.19 0.39 −2.28 15.80 0.14 13.92 0.87 
Std. Dev. 1.32 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 5.09 0.17 0.45 0.91 2.27 0.32 8.92 0.33 
Min 0.62 0 0 0 −0.22 0 9E−05 0 −4.59 7.24 −0.46 1 0 
Max 8.98 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.03 34.36 2.17 1.39 0 22.57 1.37 48 1 
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Table 2. The impact of CSR resources on market value (DV: Log Tobin’s q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Internalt-1/Assets   0.099   −0.306               
 
  (0.601)   (0.599)               
Externalt /Assets     1.646*** 1.688***               
      (0.412) (0.412)               
Sum/Assets       
 
0.115***   0.755**   0.691** 0.784 0.719** 
        
 
(0.035)   (0.342)   (0.347) (2.188) (0.365) 
Abs. (Gap/Assets)       
 
  −1.15*** −0.927**     4.76* −1.101*** 
 
      
 
  (0.38) (0.4)     (2.537) (0.419) 
Gap/Assets       
 
      1.23*** 0.997***     
        
 
      (0.355) (0.38)     
R&D Intensity −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.022 −0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005) 
SG&A Intensity −0.05 −0.049 −0.031 −0.032 −0.041 −0.046 −0.034 −0.043 −0.032 2.47*** −0.052 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.717) (0.101) 
Diversification −0.023 −0.023 −0.026 −0.025 −0.026 −0.023 −0.025 −0.023 −0.025 −0.057 −0.023 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.258) (0.028) 
Industry  −0.016 −0.015 −0.018 −0.018 −0.016 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019 −0.018 0.312 −0.012 
Concentration (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.619) (0.037) 
Sales −0.059** −0.059** −0.054** −0.055** −0.057** −0.06** −0.055** −0.061** −0.055** 0.216 −0.056** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.239) (0.027) 
Sales Growth 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.17*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.469 0.163*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.333) (0.029) 
Analyst Coverage 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** −0.003 0.01*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
SRI Index 0.047 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.007 0.042 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.029) (0.029) (0.066) (0.032) 
Constant 1.117*** 1.106*** 1.012** 1.044** 1.023** 1.18*** 1.037** 1.179*** 1.044** −3.251 1.078** 
  (0.42) (0.416) (0.418) (0.416) (0.417) (0.419) (0.417) (0.419) (0.416) (4.705) (0.418) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 178 5,780 
R-squared 0.143 0.143 0.147 0.147 0.146 0.145 0.147 0.146 0.147 0.449 0.145 
No. of Firms 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,492 124 1,482 
The table shows estimation results of Equations (5–6) with firm and year fixed effects. Parentheses contain robust standard errors. Models 10 and 11 use split samples: Model 
10 only uses observations that have a positive gap; Model 11, a negative gap. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. Results for natural resources and extractive industries (DV: Log Tobin’s q) 
  
(12) 
Full sample 
(13) 
Natural 
Resources and 
Extractives 
(14) 
Rest of 
Industries 
Abs. Value (Gap/Assets) −0.520 −2.264** −0.568 
  (0.429) (0.966) (0.437) 
Abs. Value (Gap/Assets)  Natural Res.  −2.376***     
& Extractives (0.881)     
Sum/Assets 0.736** −0.150 1.003*** 
  (0.341) (0.747) (0.382) 
R&D Intensity −0.001 0.0481** −0.0028 
  (0.0048) (0.0215) (0.0048) 
SG&A Intensity −0.0306 0.533 −0.0514 
  (0.103) (0.359) (0.107) 
Diversification −0.0253 −0.122** 0.0002 
  (0.0268) (0.0588) (0.0294) 
Industry Concentration −0.0160 0.0593 −0.0174 
  (0.0369) (0.0682) (0.0410) 
Sales −0.057** 0.0077 −0.0859*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0489) (0.0308) 
Sales Growth 0.166*** 0.108** 0.181*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0454) (0.0336) 
Analyst Coverage 0.0094*** 0.0068** 0.0096*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0015) 
SRI Index 0.0441 −0.0215 0.0552* 
  (0.0294) (0.0812) (0.0311) 
Constant 1.074** 0.265 1.487*** 
  (0.417) (0.768) (0.483) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,958 942 5,016 
R-squared 0.149 0.199 0.151 
Number of Firms 1,492 249 1,243 
The table shows estimation results of sensitivity analysis with firm and year fixed effects. Parentheses contain 
robust standard errors. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Results for CSR-intensive industries (DV: Log Tobin’s q) 
 
(15) 
Full sample 
(16) 
CSR-intensive 
(17) 
Rest of industries 
Abs. Value (Gap/Assets) 0.132 −1.497*** −0.078 
  (0.582) (0.507) (0.623) 
Abs. Value (Gap/Assets)   −1.900***     
CSR-Intensive Industry (0.706)     
Sum/Assets 0.667** 0.404 0.939* 
  (0.339) (0.452) (0.531) 
R&D Intensity −0.0012 0.0039 −0.0033 
  (0.0048) (0.0095) (0.0048) 
SG&A Intensity −0.0362 −0.0212 −0.0393 
  (0.102) (0.132) (0.151) 
Diversification −0.0273 −0.0355 −0.0106 
  (0.0266) (0.0308) (0.0466) 
Industry Concentration −0.0192 −0.0158 −0.0349 
  (0.0367) (0.0505) (0.0523) 
Sales −0.0536** −0.0531 −0.0661** 
  (0.0267) (0.0471) (0.0327) 
Sales Growth 0.165*** 0.273*** 0.130*** 
  (0.0289) (0.0551) (0.0324) 
Analyst Coverage 0.0095*** 0.0082*** 0.011*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0024) 
SRI Index 0.0408 0.0481 0.0394 
  (0.0296) (0.04) (0.0438) 
Constant 1.018** 1.031 1.124** 
  (0.416) (0.748) (0.500) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,958 2,966 2,992 
R-squared 0.149 0.182 0.136 
Number of Firms 1,492 697 795 
The table shows estimation results of sensitivity analysis with firm and year fixed effects. Parentheses contain 
robust standard errors. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX: THE COMPOSITION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS’ INDICES 
Internal 
1. Percentage of women on the board of directors. 
2. Percentage of non-executive board members on the audit committee as stipulated by the company. 
3. Percentage of non-executive board members on the nomination committee. 
4. Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company. 
5. Does the company have a policy to support the skills training or career development of its employees? 
6. Does the company have a policy to improve employee health & safety within the company and its supply chain? 
7. Does the company use environmental criteria (ISO 14000, energy consumption, etc.) in the selection process of its suppliers or sourcing partners? 
8. Does the company make use of renewable energy? 
9. Does the company have a policy to improve its energy efficiency? 
10. Does the company have a policy to improve its water efficiency? 
11. Does the company develop products or technologies that are used for water treatment, purification, or that improve water-use efficiency? 
12. Does the company have a policy to reduce emissions? 
13. Does the company have a policy for ensuring equal treatment of minority shareholders, facilitating shareholder engagement, or limiting the use of anti-
takeover devices? 
14. Does the company’s statutes or by-laws require that stock options be only granted with a vote at a shareholder meeting? 
15. Does the company have a policy for performance-oriented compensation that attracts and retains the senior executives and board members? 
16. Does the company have a policy for maintaining a well-balanced membership of the board? 
17. Does the company have an audit committee with at least three members and at least one “financial expert” within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley? 
18. Does the company have a CSR committee or team? 
19. Does the company have a policy to guarantee the freedom of association universally applied independent of local laws? AND Does the company have a 
policy for the exclusion of child, forced, or compulsory labor? 
20. Does the company have a competitive employee benefits policy or ensure good employee relations within its supply chain? AND Does the company have 
a policy for maintaining long-term employment growth and stability? 
21. Does the company have a work–life balance policy? AND Does the company have a diversity and equal opportunity policy? 
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APPENDIX CONT’D 
External 
1. Does the company reportedly develop or market products and services that foster specific health and safety benefits for the consumers (healthy, organic or 
nutritional food, safe cars, etc.)? 
2. Does the company claim to favor promotion from within? 
3. Does the company report on policies or programs on HIV/AIDS for the workplace or beyond? 
4. Does the company report on crisis management systems or reputation disaster recovery plans to reduce or minimize the effects of reputation disasters? 
5. Does the company report about environmentally friendly or green sites or offices? 
6. Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, reuse, substitute, or phase out toxic chemicals or substances? 
7. Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the environmental impact of transportation of its products or its staff? 
8. Does the company show an initiative to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, phase out, or compensate CO2 equivalents in the production process? 
9. Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, reduce, reuse, substitute, treat, or phase out total waste? 
10. Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, substitute, or phase out volatile organic compounds (VOC)? 
11. Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, or phase out SOx (sulphur oxides) or NOx (nitrogen oxides) emissions? 
12. Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, reduce, reuse, or substitute ozone-depleting (CFC-11 equivalents, chlorofluorocarbon) substances? 
13. Is the company’s CSR report published in accordance with the GRI guidelines? 
14. Is the company openly reporting about the challenges or opportunities of integrating financial and extra-financial issues, and the dilemmas and trade-offs 
it faces? 
15. Does the company’s extra-financial report take into account the global activities of the company? 
16. Does the company report or show to be ready to end a partnership with a sourcing partner if human rights criteria are not met? 
17. Does the company report or show to use human rights criteria in the selection or monitoring process of its suppliers or sourcing partners? 
18. Does the company claim to provide its employees with a pension fund, health care, or other insurance? 
19. Does the company claim to provide a bonus plan to most employees? 
20. Does the company claim to provide daycare services for its employees? 
21. Does the company have a policy to strive to be a good corporate citizen or endorse the Global Sullivan Principles? AND Does the company have a policy 
to respect business ethics or has the company signed the UN Global Compact or does it follow the OECD guidelines? 
22. Does the company have an external auditor of its CSR/H&S/Sustainability report? 
23. Does the company claim to provide flexible working hours or working hours that promote a work–life balance? 
24. Does the company claim to provide regular staff and business management training for its managers? 
 
